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Capturing Policies for BYOD
Joseph Hallett and David Aspinall?
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
Abstract. BYOD policies are informally specified using natural lan-
guage. We show how the SP4BYOD language can help reduce ambiguity
in 5 BYOD policies and link the specification of a BYOD policy to its im-
plementation. Using a formalisation of the 5 policies written in SP4BYOD,
we make comparisons between them, and explore the delegation relation-
ships within them. We identify that whilst policy acknowledgement is a
key part of all 5 policies, this is not managed by existing MDM tools.
1 Introduction
Employees bring their own devices to work. In the past employees might have
had a dedicated company device. Today around 70% of companies have a BYOD
scheme [1]. In some fields, 85% of staff use their personal devices to look up
work-sensitive information [2]. Controlling employee’s devices is a challenge for
IT departments. Failure to manage devices can lead to employees accidentally
leaking confidential information. Unfortunately companies have limited control
over the devices inside their networks if they do not own them.
One solution to controlling devices is requiring users follow BYOD policies.
A BYOD policy takes the form of a user agreement, written in natural language,
which describes how devices should be used and configured. Various guides
are available for companies wishing to implement a policy from governments,
standards bodies, and organizations seeking to advise [3, 4, 5]. On top of user
agreements, companies may also use Mobile Device Management (MDM) software
which can help enforce policies. MDM software can configure a device’s security
settings, and add security APIs, helping enforce some aspects of the policies. But
the use of MDM software does not guarantee compliance. One survey from a
leading MDM vendor found over 50% of companies using their MDM software
still had devices that did not comply with the policy [6]. Reasons for non-
compliance included out-of-date MDM configurations that hadn’t been updated,
and employees tampering with the MDM software.
BYOD policies are becoming more intricate. Prior work has looked at de-
veloping MDM software to enforce some aspects [7, 8, 9]. The MDM encoding
of a policy is only part of the problem, however. BYOD policies are specified
informally using natural language, and they contain more than just access con-
trol decisions. They describe trust relationships inside the company between IT
? Work supported by EPSRC App Guarden grant (EP/K032666/1) and the Alan
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departments, users, and HR, who each may be delegated to provide rules and
make decisions. Policies contain rules that require employees to acknowledge
risks, and regulations. An antivirus or MDM program may be used to implement
part of the policy. But it is the policy that specifies which software to use and
when. There is no automatic way to check how the policy has been implemented
and by what.
Companies lack visibility as to how well they implement their policies. When
considering what tools a company may use Morrow notes “particularly with the
BYOD trend IT professionals do not know if anti-virus software is installed or if
it’s current” [10]. Even when devices can implement policies correctly, it is hard
to configure devices that are not owned by the company [11]. Our work aims to
address these problems directly: by using formal languages we can link the policy
to the implementation.
To describe the BYOD policies we present SP4BYOD: a formal language for
linking policies to the tools used to implement them, and distributing decisions
to relevant parties. Using a formalization of five BYOD policies written using
SP4BYOD we identify different idioms and common delegation patterns present
in BYOD policies. Our formalizations pick out the common concerns and trust
relationships in these policies. We look at what decisions and trust relationships
are used in BYOD policies. We identify BYOD idioms that capture frequently
seen decisions in BYOD policies. These give a guide for where future work
implementing MDM tools should focus their efforts to cover more aspects of
policies.
SP4BYOD is not designed to replace existing static and dynamic analysis and
enforcement tools. A company might use multiple tools, app stores, or contractual
agreements with employees to enforce their policies. We aim to help clarify the
meaning of ambiguous natural language policy documents, and provide a rigorous
means for following them. A company can use any MDM tool, curated app store
or user agreement to enforce their policy. SP4BYOD links the specification of
the policy to its implementation, showing exactly how a policy is implemented
and giving a rigorous means to enforce it.
We show how SP4BYOD can be used to encode policies and describe precisely
the different trust relationships. SP4BYOD is an instantiation of the SecPAL
authorization language [12] for mobile device policies and implemented atop
of AppPAL [13], which adds mobile device specific predicates to SecPAL, for
example, capturing app permissions. SecPAL is also a useful tool for describing
other policies surrounding mobile ecosystems [14]. Our SP4BYOD implementation
can be easily extended to support new types of policies. It also gives us access
to tooling we have developed to check SP4BYOD policies for completeness
and redundant statements. For this work additional tooling was developed to
help visualise policies and describe their contents. This was helpful for making
comparisons between policies and checking our formalisation for mistakes.
In summary, our work makes the following contributions:
– We present a formalisation of five different BYOD policies in SP4BYOD: a
new instantiation of SecPAL for describing BYOD policies (Section 2).
– Using our formalisation of the policies we make comparisons between the
different policies. Unlike previous work which looks at individual policies [15],
our work looks at policies across a variety of domains (Section 4).
– We identify that delegation and acknowledgements are an important aspect
of BYOD policies that current MDM software does not look at (Section 6).
1.1 Related Work
Martinelli et al.’s work looks at creating a dynamic permissions manager, called
UC-Droid. Their tool can alter what an app’s Android permissions are at run
time based on policies [8]. The tool allows companies to reconfigure their apps
depending on whether the employee is at work, in a secret lab, or working out-of-
hours. These kinds of policies are more configurable than the geofenced based
policies some MDM tools provide. Other work has looked at enforcing different
policies based on what roles an employee holds [7]. The work allowed a company
to verify the devices within their network and what servers and services they
could access. It also describes a mechanism for providing different users with
different policies.
Armando et al. developed BYODroid as a tool for enforcing BYOD policies
through a secure marketplace [16]. Their tool allows companies to distribute apps
through a secure app store [9]. The store ensures apps meet policies through
a combination of static analysis and app rewriting with dynamic enforcement.
Their policies are low level, based on ConSpec [17], allowing checks based on
Dalvik VM’s state. Using their tool, they implemented parts of a NATO Commu-
nications and Information Agency policy relating to personal networks and data
management [15]. Their work shows how the app-specific sections of a BYOD
policy can be check and enforced using tools. They did not look at where the
checks or policies come from, however.
An SP4BYOD policy might use BYODroid to ensure that parts of a policy
are enforced (as well as other tools for other parts). Using SP4BYOD, we can
distribute policies by sharing signed statements from different principals. We
can delegate to other marketplaces to decide if an app meets different parts
of policies. We can even create new stores by composing their policies and
using multiple store’s statements about the apps. Distributing checks like this is
useful when using some static analysis tools which can take a long time to run
(e.g. TaintDroid [18]).
Tools, such as Dr. Android and Mr. Hyde [19] and Aurasium [20], have
suggested app wrapping (where an app is recompiled to use guarded APIs) as
a possible way to enforce policies. App rewriting has the advantage that the
device’s underlying OS needn’t be modified as the apps are changed at the source
code level. However app wrapping alone without additional analysis is insufficient
to enforce policies effectively [21].
Our approach taken with SP4BYOD is similar to work on safety cases. A
safety case is an argument made to say a system is acceptably safe to be used in
a given scenario. Industrial safety cases are often described in natural language,
which can be ambiguous and unclear. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [22] is one
approach to make the safety cases explicit. It is a graphical formal notation that
lets engineers argue that a system is safe by linking safety goals to the arguments
made for a system’s safety. Similarly, work developing a formal language for
specifying how medical staff should collaborate in a healthcare scenario [23] again
helps clarify how roles are filled in a medical context on the basis of staff and
different healthcare providers.
It is interesting to examine how leading [24] MDM tools such as IBM’s
MaaS360, or Blackberry Enterprise Services (BES), enforce BYOD policies.
These tools support enforcing and checking compliance policies. They do not,
however, use policy languages to specify policies; rather they provide a limited
number of checkboxes that admins can tweak (an excerpt of a policy from
MaaS360 is shown in Figure 1). These tools allow administrators to configure a
device’s settings and provision the devices with company apps. Some support app
wrapping, which enables them to encrypt app data locally, use a VPN within the
app, or prevent apps not being used when the device isn’t compliant. But because
the policies are inflexible and tightly coupled to the device’s OS, intervention by
an administrator is often required. Whilst MDM software is good at configuring
devices, selecting which policies to apply is typically a manual process performed
by an administrator. Removing blacklisted apps is a common feature, but the
selection process of which apps to remove is manual.
Fig. 1. Excerpt of a policy showing network settings from MaaS360.
2 Capturing BYOD Policies
As mobile devices have become more common in the workplace, BYOD policies
have been written to help control them. Part of their policies are prescriptive: if
you configure your device in this way, you will mitigate that threat. The policies
contain more than just configuration, however. Consider this rule taken from
the Security Policy for the use of handheld devices in corporate environments by
SANS [3].
SANS: Digital camera embedded on handheld devices might be disabled in restricted
environments, according to 〈COMPANY NAME〉 risk analysis. In sensitive facilities,
information can be stolen using pictures and possibly sent using MMS or E-mail
services.
In high-security facilities such as R&D labs or design manufacturers, camera
MUST be disabled. Furthermore, MMS messages should be disabled as well, to
prevent malicious users from sending proprietary pictures.
A company could use an MDM program to enforce this. Some MDM tools
can use geofencing to apply a policies in the area around a lab. Techniques like
this would implement the recommendation within the rule, but the rule itself
contains more than just configuration. It talks of restricted environments decided
by company risk analysis. How is this communicated to the device? Does it
access the list of restricted environments once from a server, are they fixed or
can a device decide them for itself? Can it judge using a policy if a location is
restricted? The rule also gives a security objective: prevent malicious users from
sending proprietary pictures. The guidelines are given, however, for the case of a
legitimate user using MMS or email. It may not be sufficient to stop a sufficiently
motivated malicious user.
Our approach does not try to enforce the policy by checking the app’s code
for programming errors. Rather we act as a “glue-layer” between the high-level
policy and the tools and trust relationships used to implement them. We capture
the goals of the policy rules so that the delegations of trust, tools implementing
the policy and their configuration are made explicit. This gives us greater clarity
as to which tool is being trusted to implement what policy. It allows us to see
who is being trusted to make which decisions, and use automatic-tools to uncover
problematic aspects of the policy [14]. Continuing with the example above, we
can encode this in SP4BYOD as:
’company’ says ’risk−analyst’ can-say
Location:L isHighSecurityFacility.
’company’ says Device:D mustDisableIn(Location, ’camera’)
if Location isHighSecurityFacility.
’company’ says Device:D mustDisableIn(Location, ’mms’)
if Location isHighSecurityFacility.
’company’ says User:U hasSatisfied(’proprietary pictures policy’)
if U hasDevice(D),
D mustDisableIn(Location, ’camera’),
D mustDisableIn(Location, ’mms’),
Location isHighSecurityFacility.
After checking the policy we generate a proof tree that shows how the policy
was satisfied. These proof trees not only show how the policy was followed but
also provide an audit trail. In a company decisions may be delegated to different
departments. Auditors can see what happened when things go wrong. They know
who made what decision, and whether they made it through following policy
rules or as a stated fact.
3 Instantiating SecPAL
SecPAL was developed as a distributed access control language [12]. It is designed
to be have a clear readable syntax, and intuitive semantics. It is also designed to
be extensible, which makes it ideal for extending to create new languages. All
SecPAL statements are said by an explicit authority. The authority can say a
fact (that something is described by a predicate), a delegation (that someone
else can-say a fact), or a role assignment (that something can-act-as something
else). This statement optionally contain conditional facts, and constraints that
must be satisfied before the authority will say the statement.
To create SP4BYOD we instantiate SecPAL with four kinds of facts common in
BYOD policies: can, has, is and must. Like other SecPAL-based instantiations [25,
26] we extend the syntax of facts to support these constructs.
Fact Meaning
subject canAction The subject is permitted to perform the action.
subject hasAction The subject has performed the action.
subject isType The subject is a member of the type.
subject mustAction The subject must perform the action.
Facts of the must-kind represent obligations, actions to complete if a particular
scenario presents itself. For these facts, we add a rule to check we perform the
obligation. This rule should be checked periodically to ensure compliance. Our
implementation contains tooling to generate these rules automatically, by parsing
the policy.
〈speaker〉 says 〈subject〉 hasSatisfiedObligation〈Action〉
if 〈subject〉 must〈Action〉,
〈subject〉 has〈Action〉.
Facts using is predicates give types to variables. SP4BYOD inherits from
SecPAL’s (and Datalog’s) safety condition that the body of a statements must
reference all the variables in the head. This can lead to some boilerplate code
in policies that may obscure their meaning. To simplify the policies, we add
syntactic sugar for facts giving variables their type (variable isType). Variables
in the head of the statement of the form Type :Variable are replaced by the
variable and a condition Variable isType is added to the condition. The two
statements shown below (taken from the SANS policy) are equivalent, however
we feel the example on the right is easier to read.
’company’ says Device
canConnectToAP(X)
if X isOwnedByCompany,
Device isDevice,
X isAP.
’company’ says Device:D
canConnectToAP(AP:X)
if X isOwnedByCompany.
4 BYOD Policies
We examined 5 policies and encoded them into SP4BYOD looking for common
idioms. We selected these policies as they came from a variety of domains.
– The first is the Security Policy Template: Use of Handheld Devices in a
Corporate Environment, published by the SANS Institute [3]. This policy is
a hypothetical policy published to help companies mitigate the threats to
corporate assets caused by mobile devices. Companies are expected to modify
the document to suit their needs. The policy is general; not specific to any
particular industry, device, or country’s legislation.
– The second is taken from the Healthcare Information Management System
Society (HiMSS) [27]; a US non-profit company trying to improve healthcare
through IT. The HiMSS policy is relatively short and contains concerns
specific to healthcare scenarios. It is written as a contract the users agree
to follow. In contrast, every other policy we looked at is written as an
organisation imposing rules on users they should follow to ensure compliance.
The policy is designed as a sample agreement for a system trying to manage
personal mobile devices in a healthcare environment.
– The third is taken from a British hospital trust [28] and describes the BYOD
scheme used in practice at the hospital.
– Finally, we looked at two simpler policies from The University of Edin-
burgh [29] and a company specialising in emergency sirens [30]. These policies
are simpler, and shorter than the other policies we looked at comprised of
much more general rules.
We summarise the policies in Table 1. Each policy contains a series of rules,
which we implemented by one or more SP4BYOD statements. The policy coverage
represents the number of rules that have an SP4BYOD description attached.
All five of the policies make use of acknowledgements. The use of an acknowl-
edgements could be because enforcing that rule in a policy through technical
1 The Edinburgh policy contains a large number of rules that whilst marked as such
are in fact just descriptions of the document. All the policy rules that described
restrictions or relationships were implemented in SP4BYOD.
SANS HiMSS NHS Edinburgh Sirens
Number of rules 33 15 56 20 25
SP4BYOD statements 71 21 58 10 39
Policy coverage 33 (100%) 14 (93%) 40 (71%) 10 (100%)1 22 (88%)
Rules using Acknowledgement 2 10 11 1 6
Rules using Delegation 23 5 33 2 13
Rules describing a restriction 18 3 8 1 5
Principal Speaker company user nhs-trust records-management department
Table 1. Summary of the contents of each of the BYOD policies.
means is undesirable. It could indicate policy authors care more that the subjects
are aware of the rules than they do for rigorous enforcement. All but the HiMSS
policy have rules that include locking down a device by disabling features. All
but the Edinburgh policy have rules that look at what should happen if a user
loses their device. The rest have rules that require employees inform someone
when something happens. Common concerns, such as these, suggest where future
MDM software should focus their efforts.
Only the NHS and SANS policies, the two most complex policies, describe
when a device can install an app and what kinds of apps are installable. In both
policies this expressed as a delegation to the appropriate groups to authorize an
app. For example, in the SANS policy the IT-Department are responsible for
deciding what apps can be installed. The NHS policy, however, is significantly
more complicated. Apps have to be approved by three different groups (the IGC,
the Employee’s manager, and the relevant group for either clinical or business
cases) before the Trust will say that an employee can install an app.
NHS: Apps for work usage must not be downloaded onto corporately issued mobile
devices (even if approved on the NHS apps store) unless they have been approved
through the following Trust channels: Clinical apps; at the time of writing there are
no apps clinically approved by the Trust for use with patients/clients. However, if a
member of staff believes that there are clinical apps or other technologies that could
benefit their patients/clients, this should be discussed with the clinical lead in the
first instance and ratification should be sought via the Care and Clinical Policies
Group. A clinical app should not be used if it has not been approved via this group.
Business apps; at the time of writing there are no business (i.e., non-clinical) apps
approved by the Trust for use other than those preloaded onto the device at the
point of issue. However, if a member of staff believes that there are apps or other
technologies that could benefit their non-clinical work, ratification of the app must
be sought via the Management of Information Group (MIG). An app should not be
used if it has not been approved via this group. Following approval through Care
and Clinical Policies and/or MIG, final approval will be required through Integrated
Governance Committee. Use of paid apps must be agreed in advance with the device
holder’s line manager and there should be a demonstrable benefit.
’nhs−trust’ says App isUsable if App hasMet(’clinical−use−case’).
’nhs−trust’ says App isUsable if App hasMet(’business−use−case’).
’nhs−trust’ says ’cacpg’ can-say App:A hasMet(’clinical−use−case’).
’nhs−trust’ says ’mig’ can-say App:A hasMet(’business−use−case’).
’nhs−trust’ says App isInstallable
if App hasMet(’final−app−approval’), App isUsable.
’nhs−trust’ says ’igc ’ can-say App hasMet(’final−app−approval’).
’nhs−trust’ says Device canInstall(App)
if App isInstallable, App isApprovedFor(Device).
’nhs−trust’ says Employee:Manager can-say
App:A isApprovedFor(Device)
if Manager isResponsibleFor(Device).
We might expect corporate policies to describe what apps can be installed in
terms of the apps functionality. This does not appear to be the case, however.
As part of selecting the apps, an IT department or group may choose to use
advanced instrumentation and policies [9]. Alternatively, they may manually
chose apps to form a curated app store as some MDM vendors allow. From the
perspective of the policy, it is more important who makes the decision rather
than what they chose, however.
5 Authorization Example
As a worked-example consider the NHS rules for finding approved apps (Section 4).
Suppose an employee, Alice, wished to get an app, com.microsoft.office,
installed on their device. To do so, Alice would have to convince the device that:
’nhs−trust’ says ’ alices−phone’ canInstall(’com.microsoft.office ’).
Alice wishes to use the app for business so to satisfy the policy Alice must
collect the following statements:
– ’nhs−trust’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ isInstallable.
For this, she needs a statement from the Management of Information Group
that it has a business use-case. She also needs approval from the Integrated
Governance Committee.
1. ’mig’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ hasMet(’business−use−case’).
2. ’ igc ’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ hasMet(’ final−app−approval’).
– ’nhs−trust’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ isApprovedFor(’alices−device’). To get
this she needs a statement from the manager responsible for Alice’s device
(Bob) approving the app.
3. ’bob’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ isApprovedFor(’alices−device’).
4. ’nhs−trust’ says ’bob’ isResponsibleFor(’alices−device’).
– Additionally, she needs the following typing statements.
5. ’nhs−trust’ says ’com.microsoft . office ’ isApp.
6. ’nhs−trust’ says ’bob’ isEmployee.
Alice obtains the statements by contacting each of the speakers. Each may
either give her the statement she needs or may give her additional rules. For
example, the MIG and IGC may be happy to state their statements (after a
review). When checking if the app is an App in Item 5, the NHS trust may be
instead inclined to delegate further. They could reply that if the App is in the
Google Play store then they are convinced it is an app. Alice would then have
to obtain additional statements if she wanted to prove this statement. As with
SecPAL, all statements should have a signature from their speaker proving they
said the statement. Alternatively, the speaker could refuse to give the statement,
either because they do not believe it to be true, or they cannot give an answer.
In this case, Alice would have to look for an alternative means to prove the
statement or accept that they cannot install the app.
When the statements have been collected Alice can use a SecPAL inference
tool (such as AppPAL2) to check the policy has been satisfied. The generated
proof from the tool lets auditors review how the decision was made, and verify
the decision-making process.
6 BYOD Idioms
When examining the policies, we noticed two particular idioms in many policies:
acknowledgements and delegation. We describe both idioms in greater detail,
and show how they can be implemented in SP4BYOD, below. MDM tools and
research have focussed so far on implementing restrictions on apps and devices [31,
32, 8]. Implementing these controls is a vital aspect of BYOD policies and all 5
of the policies we looked at had rules that described restrictions (Table 1). Every
policy also contained rules that required employees acknowledgements, however.
Only the SANS policy (which is configuration focussed) contained more rules
that required restrictions than acknowledgements. All the policies contained more
rules featuring delegation relationships than functionality restrictions.
Delegation and Roles within Policies. Delegation is an important part of
each of the policies. Each of the policies describes through rules how separate
entities may be responsible for making some decisions. These rules can be a
delegation to an employee’s manager to authorize a decision (as in the NHS
policy). It could be to technical staff to decide what apps are part of a standard
install (as in the sirens and SANS policies).
SP4BYOD requires an explicit speaker for each statement. Speakers can
delegate to others by making a statement about what they can-say. When
translating the policies, the author of the policy is used as the primary speaker of
the policy’s rule (Table 1). For the HiMSS policy, where the user states what they
will do rather than the company stating what they must, the user is the primary
speaker. All the policies describe multiple entities that might make statements
and delegate. With SP4BYOD policies any speaker can delegate a decision to
2 https://github.com/apppal/libapppal
another speaker (with restrictions on re-delegation). The delegation might be to
a user to acknowledge a policy, or it might be to other groups in the company
who are responsible for certain decisions.
In all the policies we looked at the majority of the decisions are made by three
groups of speakers: the company, the IT-department, and the users or employees.
All the policies also delegate to a user (apart from HiMSS where the user is the
primary speaker). The user is typically responsible for providing information,
such as agreements to policies, reporting devices missing, and updating passcodes.
In the Sirens, SANS and NHS policy each describe an IT-department who are
delegated to make some decisions. The HiMSS policy describes an xyz-health-
system who act similarly to an IT-department. These decisions are more varied
and can overlap with the responsibilities of the company. In the NHS and SANS
policies, the IT department is responsible for maintaining lists of activated devices.
In the Sirens and SANS policies, the IT department maintains a list of what is
installable on a device or not.
When a policy decision requires input from a third-party delegation is used.
For example, an employee’s manager has to authorise an app install. The SecPAL
can-say statement is the basis for a delegation. We can ask the HR department
to state who is someone’s manager.
’company’ says ’hr−department’ can-say
Employee:E hasManager(Employee:M).
If we wish to delegate to someone, we can add conditionals to the can-say
statement that enforces any relationship between the delegating and delegated
parties.
’company’ says Manager can-say
Employee canInstall(App:A)
if Employee hasManager(Manager).
Acknowledgement. All the policies we looked at require their subjects to be
aware and acknowledge certain rules or policies, and that the company may
perform certain actions. For example, the NHS and HiMSS policies state that
the organisation will wipe devices remotely to protect confidential information a
user loses their device. Both policies also say that employees would lose personal
information if they had it on the device and the company needed to erase it. The
employee is required to be aware of this, and in the case of the HiMSS policy,
agree to hold the company harmless for the loss.
Both the SANS and the siren-company policies use acknowledgements to link
to other sets of rules that employees should follow. These policies are not further
specified, and in the case of an acceptable use policy may be hard to enforce
automatically. The SANS policy requires that all employees follow an email
security, acceptable use, and an eCommerce-security policy. The Sirens policy
expects an employee to use their devices ethically and abide by an acceptable
use policy.
When there is a (usually separate) set of rules and concerns employees should
be aware of acknowledgements are used. The company may not wish to enforce
these separate rules automatically, however. For instance, a company may have
an ethics policy that says employees should not use devices for criminal purposes.
The company is not interested in, or capable of, defining what is criminal. They
trust their employees to make the right decision and to be aware of the rules.
To implement these in SP4BYOD, a policy author creates two rules: the first
stating their employees must have acknowledged the policy, the second delegating
the acceptance of the policy to the employee themselves.
’company’ says Employee:E mustAcknowledged(’policy’).
’company’ says Employee:E can-say
E hasAcknowledged(’policy’).
7 Conclusions
We have presented SP4BYOD: an instantiation of SecPAL for BYOD policies.
Using an SP4BYOD formalization of 5 BYOD policies we have identified that
whilst delegation and acknowledgement form a large part of written BYOD
policies, existing BYOD tools ignore them. BYOD policies contain delegation and
trust relationships that define who is responsible for making different decisions in
a company. Sometimes that is administrators and technical staff deciding what
to permit inside the company, and sometimes it is the user’s themselves agreeing
to follow a policy. Previous work has focussed on the technical staff’s decisions
and developing new ways to automate their decisions. Our work looks at the
policies at a higher level tracking, managing and authorizing policies based on
what people have said and what tools were run.
SP4BYOD improves upon existing MDM tools by allowing sophisticated
delegation relations and by providing a declarative language for expressing
policies. The language gives greater flexibility to policy authors and allows them
to write policies that depend on other policies rather than predefined settings
and groups. It lets us track what users have agreed to, what their policies are,
how they are specified, and how they are satisfied.
Acknowledgements were used in all the policies, but were not a part of MDM
tools. A purely speculative explanation for this might be that the people using the
MDM software (the IT department) do not care about the acknowledgements, and
that another department (HR perhaps) are responsible for tracking what corporate
policies employees have agreed to and have their own methods for dealing with
that. Future work will aim to further explore how these acknowledgements are
used within a company and how to manage them in a practical manner.
Related systems, such as GSN described in Subsection 1.1, use a graphical
notation. Whilst SecPAL-based languages are designed to be readable, diagrams
can help make authors write policies and auditors understand them. Future work
will look at extending SecPAL’s notation to create such diagrams and further
aid readability.
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